by Hide Izumi
I have had the honor of working directly with a few, and I think they bring something to the table that is badly lacking right now in this country.
It is a mean but common joke that “world’s strongest army would be run by American generals, German officers and Japanese soldiers.” For me, it really isn’t funny, because it points to a fundamental problem in this country that has been a constant – lack of competent high level leadership.
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” Dear Supporter: I am writing to update you, and to respectfully ask you or your institution to make a donation of 300,000 Yen or more this year, either as a Sustaining Donor or as a Corporate Participating Member. (As explained below in section 5, the latter category now allows donors which are investing institutions to receive 40% discounts on all BDTI courses/seminars that are open to the public, and to share these discounts with companies in their portfolio.)
There is an excellent article in Rudlin Consulting’s newsletter about Nidec’s “work – style” reforms, that will probably “hit the spot” for many in Japan. A juicy excerpt: “One area Nidec tackled was unnecessary meetings. In just 4 months at one of their subsidiaries, Tosok, the number of types of meetings was reduced from 156 […]
Recently, many major Japanese companies have been bringing non-Japanese executives to Japan to fill key roles in their global operations. Diversifying the ranks of senior executives is an important step forward for Japanese firms. But it also represents a significant change in terms of how communication and decision-making works at the highest levels of the organization.
Non-Japanese executives working in Japan have few chances to meet their peers at other Japanese firms. There are also few chances to have in-depth and meaningful conversations about the unique issues faced by Japanese companies in the process of becoming truly global entities.
Based on its long experience organizing forums for Japanese executives, the well-regarded Business Research Institute is establishing a new forum designed for non-Japanese executives in Japan and their Japanese counterparts to participate in together. This new forum will provide an important opportunity for networking and discussion. It will be held entirely in English, and will provide the opportunity for frank and in-depth exchange of opinions in a confidential setting.
”Russell Reynolds Associates recently interviewed numerous institutional and activist investors, pension fund managers, public company directors and other governance professionals about the trends and challenges that public company boards will face in 2017. Our conversations yielded a wide array of perspectives about the forces that are driving change in the corporate governance landscape.
”The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently released a report of a survey that was conducted based on the responses to a questionnaire on corporate governance frameworks that was disseminated to partner organisations in the 14 participating Asian jurisdictions in May 2016. These included Bangladesh, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
The survey which is a useful document to all stakeholders that are working towards corporate governance reforms in the region is a reflection of current status of practices and standards. Role of stakeholders, disclosure of related parties, shareholder rights, board and ownerships structures are some of the key areas highlighted.”
Read the full report here.
This study examines the gender wage gap across the wage distribution in Japan using large sample data for 1990, 2000, and 2014. The results of the Firpo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition show that the part of the observed gender gap that is not explained by gender differences in human capital is larger at the top and at the bottom of the wage distribution, indicating that both a glass ceiling and a sticky floor exist for women in the Japanese labor market…….
”In the last few years, policy makers in Japan have embarked on an ambitious effort to decisively get the economy out of deflation and revive growth. This policy approach, which has been dubbed “Abenomics” after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, comprises three so-called “arrows”, namely monetary policy, fiscal policy, and growth enhancing structural reforms. In this article, we seek to evaluate the effects of Abenomics’ reforms in terms of inclusiveness. Inclusive growth is a multidimensional concept and the notion has varying definitions, interpretations and connotations. To study the degree of inclusiveness of the Japanese economy, we will first review trends in equity, and then refer to econometric studies attempting to assess how implementation of Abenomics is expected to affect inclusive growth…..”.
Read full article here.
In this paper, I analyze the optimal choice of board of directors using the dual role model of boards in Adams and Ferreira (2007). In my model, shareholders choose either an informed board that brings additional private information to the firm or an uninformed board that merely considers the inside information already available within the firm. The board then randomly chooses a good chief executive officer (CEO) with inside information or a bad CEO without such information, and the CEO decides whether to consult with the board when making a project decision. I show that shareholders generally choose the informed board to maximize firm value by utilizing the private information available to the board. However, the shareholders optimally select the uninformed board if the CEO is reluctant to communicate with the informed board for fear it will reject the CEO’s decision. The uninformed board is also optimal when the board has a sufficiently large private benefit of monitoring the CEO, the shareholders feel burdened by any conflict between the CEO and the board, or the firm is involved in many unrelated businesses, especially when the inside information is valuable and the firm needs many outsiders to observe useful outside information. I use some of these implications and casual observation of real-world data to discuss recent trends in the board structure of Japanese firms.