Executive Summary To me – the guy who proposed the code – the most important logic of Japan’s corporate governance code is: Japan needs committees even more than other countries, because there are so few outside directors to set the base for “committees”, Japanese companies must first appoint “multiple” independent directors Japan needs any and […]
“…. Still, the longer the BOJ’s buying persists, the bigger the risk that market prices will detach from fundamentals. Assuming Goldman Sachs’s prediction for more stimulus proves correct, the central bank could end up owning a quarter of Mitsumi Electric Co., a supplier to Apple Inc., and 21 percent of Fast Retailing by the end of 2017, estimates compiled by Bloomberg show.
”Many Japanese companies aren’t happy about the biggest overhaul of corporate governance in decades — and they’ve been letting the world’s biggest pension fund know.
Japanese companies continue to sit on a mountain of excess cash. According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, this mountain actually grew to $1.5 trillion in 2015 from $1.4 trillion in 2011, despite substantial increases in dividends and stock buybacks. During that same period, capital expenditure shrank by more than half……….”
(Note: The numbers below correspondto page numbers in the Powerpoint presentation, which can be downloadedbelow.)
BDTI’s Representative Director Nicholas Benes is quoted in his article about Sharp in the Financial Times this morning. Excerpts:
Sharp, a century old stalwart of corporate Japan, has unveiled an annual loss of $1.9bn and warned of “material uncertainty” about its ability to stay in business, less than three years after facing a similar crisis of survival.