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Public Comment to the METI Fair M&A Study Group (by Nicholas Benes)

2019-02-03 posted by 1 Comment

As the person who initially proposed the Corporate Governance Code to the LDP in 2013 and 2014, I am well aware of its limitations in various areas. For this reason, I am very pleased that Fair M&A Study Group have decided that its discussions should cover not only MBOs, but also ”cases which are likewise significantly affected by the issues of conflict of interest and information asymmetry”[1], including “cases of acquisition of a controlled company by its controlling shareholder.”[2]

This indeed an important mission, because these topics include virtually all types of M&A transactions and the public statements of executives and boards with regard to them. For many years in the post-war era, the failure of the government and the JPX/TSE to set forth clear bright-line rules that facilitate a fair, robust M&A market in Japan has stunted productivity, dynamism and growth in the Japanese economy.

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“Linkage Between Corporate Governance and Value Creation” (METRICAL/BDTI) – Update as of January, 2019

2019-02-03 posted by

Our joint research – “Linkage Between Corporate Governance and Value Creation” – between BDTI and METRICAL has been updated as of January 31. The most important inferences are summarized below.

(1) Correlations: Board Practices
and Performance

Significant correlation between board practices and performance continues.

(a) ROE: Nominations Committee existence, the number of female directors and percentage of INEDs show a significant positive correlation.

(b) Tobins Q: Nominations Committee, retired top management “advisors” (ex-CEO “advisors”), and percentage of INEDs show significant positive correlation.

(c) ROA (actual): Compensation Committee existence (negative correlation), Incentive Compensation Plan disclosure, and retired top management (ex-CEO) serving as advisors show significant correlation.

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松下幸之助の言葉

2019-02-01 posted by

今から40年前、50年前に松下幸之助が語ったコーポレートガバナンスとスチュワードシップの考えが、今注目されています。昨年月刊誌『Voice』で松下幸之助の「株式の大衆化で新たな繁栄を」と題する文章が紹介されました。 同氏の『実践経営哲学』からの引用と併せて紹介します。

曰く、株式会社は、社長や重役のものではなく、 株主のものであると同時に、社会の「公器」でもある。 決算期ごとに株主総会で業績を報告し、業績が良いモノは 株主から称賛とねぎらいの言葉を頂戴する。 充分な成果が上がらなかった時には、 謹んでお叱りを被る。これが、本来の姿であり、 株主は経営者の御主人である事を決して忘れてはならない。 株主は短期的な売買姿勢をとらず、むしろ「主人公」として毅然とした態度を保つ事が大事である。 単に株式を保有して配当を受け取るだけでなく、株主としての権威、見識をもって 経営者を叱咤激励する事も望ましい。（BDTIによる要約。以下は各出典本文から引用。）

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Amended, Detailed Public Comment by Nicholas Benes to JPX re: “Review of the TSE Cash Equity Market Structure”

2019-01-31 posted by

NOTE:  This public comment supersedes and replaces the one that I, Nicholas Benes, submitted on January 12, 2019)

As the person who initially proposed the Corporate Governance Code to the LDP in 2013 and 2014, and suggested a number of principles in it, I am well aware of its limitations in various areas and the fact that Japan has not yet attained the quality level for an equity market that is expected by global investors. In this sense I am very pleased that the JPX has decided to review its equity market structure and related standards.

Challenges and Realities

This indeed an important mission, for which is it essential to recognize and discuss the impact of a number of challenges that Japan faces in improving governance, efficiency, and trustworthiness of its equity capital markets. These challenges include:

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Public Comment by Nicholas Benes to JPX re: “Review of the TSE Cash Equity Market Structure”

2019-01-12 posted by

(As submitted to the JPX on January 12, 2019)
There should be only two sections of the JPX: (1) a TSE Premium Section and (2) an Emerging Companies Section.
Listing on the Premium Section should have the following requirements in addition to the existing TSE1 listing criteria:
(a) a five-year average market capitalization exceeding 50 Billion yen; (b) the ratio of total “policy holding stocks” (seisakuhoyukabu, 政策保有株) to [net assets less cash equivalents（純資産ー現金等）] as of the most recent FYE “yuho” financial report (or the one submitted just after any AGM) must not be more than 15%（10% in 2022, and 5% in 2024); (c) use of the electronic voting platform; (d) convocation notices must be sent out by both post and electronic methods at least four weeks before each AGM; (e) production of financial reports, kessan tanshin, corporate governance reports, convocation notices, and jigyou hokokusho in both Japanese and English, in all cases using XBRL formats using the same XBRL tags as those used for the respective Japanese materials…

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Is Mr. Ghosn’s understatement of compensation ”material”?

2019-01-08 posted by

Mr. Ghosn and Nissan are charged with misrepresentation of securities reports.  The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act provides for civil liability as well as criminal liability for acts of misrepresentation of securities.  Nissan will face a civil lawsuit seeking damages from investors in no distant future.  One of the issues that will be argued in civil lawsuits […]

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Damages Estimation- How Much Will Nissan Have to Pay to Investors?

2018-12-25 posted by

Mr. Ghosn’s criminal cases are ongoing. But the criminal cases alone will not put a close to this entire ordeal. It is a matter of time for Nissan to face civil cases filed by investors. Due to Mr. Ghosn’s understated compensation, it is anticipated that a considerable amount of assets will flow out of Nissan. The largest part of this outflow will be accounted for the damages claimed by and awarded to investors in civil lawsuits. What amount of assets will flow out of Nissan? This memo is an attempt to estimate the probable size of these damages.

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01/29 (Tue) Seminar “Jamie Allen, Secretary General of ACGA: Next-Stage Governance Policies for Japan, and What Companies Need to Do”

2018-12-21 posted by

In early December, the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) released the ninth edition of the highly anticipated CG Watch 2018 report, published in collaboration with CLSA. Titled “Hard Decisions: Asia faces tough choices in CG reform”, this biennial regional survey of corporate governance compares and ranks 12 markets in Asia Pacific. Unfortunately, Japan was downgraded from the third position to the seventh position in the report. In this seminar, Jamie Allen, ACGA’s Secretary General will explain the ranking process. He will also talk about how Japan’s fall in ranking in the survey does not mean Japan is “going backwards” on corporate governance. On the contrary, the report recognizes the progress that’s being made in many areas. However, Jamie will clarify how Japan’s regulatory reform needs to focus more on “hard law” (e.g., takeover rules, third-party allotments, collective engagement rules) and not just principles-based “soft law” (CG Code, Stewardship Code). Jamie will carve out a roadmap for the future to bring about cultural or behavioural change on the part of companies, investors and other stakeholders, and will focus on timely issues as the protection of minority shareholders.

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5 Myths About Digitizing the Boardroom

2018-12-21 posted by

Recent advances in technology have sparked a seismic shift in how companies operate and communicate. At the boardroom level, paper systems are drifting out and being replaced with upgraded tools and processes that streamline board activities.
You may be struggling to pinpoint the true benefits a board portal may bring to your organization, or you may have some assumptions about the technology that is inhibiting you from looking into a solution further.

This checklist spotlights some of the most common myths about digitizing the boardroom, and will illustrate the ways board portal technology can streamline information sharing and accelerate collaboration.

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