日本におけるコーポレート・ガバナンス改革の背景

当ブログに頻繁に訪れる方々は、日本の主要なガバナンス改革に深い関心を寄せておられますが、これらの改革がどのように行われてきたかについては、なかなか知る機会が無いのが現状です。
 カリフォルニア大学バークレー校 政治学教授スティーヴ・K・ヴォ―ゲル氏が、簡潔に分かりやすく、1990年以降の日本におけるコーポレート・ガバナンス改革の歴史をまとめられているので、ご紹介いたします。
 1990年代初頭、政府と産業界のトップが米国型の株主資本主義への移行を模索し、外国人株主の増加が改革へと向かう強い圧力となり、改革へ向かいました。 
 当時の状況としては、依然として、企業は表面的な調整をする傾向があり、政府省庁は、企業の再編の必要性を感じつつも、徐々に進めていく状況にありました。
 コーポレート・ガバナンス改革へ情熱をもっていた自民党塩崎恭久氏(当時、経済再生本部部長代行)は、BDTI代表ニコラス・ベネシュから具体的な提案を受け、日本の金融庁と東京証券取引所に働きかけて今日の日本のコーポレートガバナンス・コード確立へと導きました。
 
コーポレート・ガバナンス 改革の狙いは、「意思決定の改善、経営者の説明責任の強化」と、「株主とステークホルダーの双方への利益」を追求することにありました。

本文はこちら:
Japan’s Ambivalent Pursuit of Shareholder Capitalism by Steven K. Vogel 2019

(抜粋、p 8 bottom)
“Yasuhisa Shiozaki, the Acting Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, played the leading role in the corporate governance reform. Shiozaki was a former Bank of Japan official known for his expertise in financial affairs, who had served as Chief Cabinet Secretary in the first Abe administration (2006-07). Benes, the American reform advocate, advised Shiozaki to stick with the comply or explain framework rather than to push for a statutory requirement for outside directors. The business community had already accepted the comply or explain concept under the DPJ, Benes figured, so Shiozaki would be best off to accept that and then press for results through a detailed “soft law” corporate governance code. Shiozaki recalls the subtle negotiations over how to structure the deliberations: 

‘I engaged in an intensive back-and-forth exchange of drafts with the Financial Services Agency by e-mail. I wanted the FSA to handle the corporate governance code because the TSE is a private company and the listed companies are its clients, so it cannot push through things those clients do not want. Eventually we agreed that the FSA and TSE would jointly organize the council of experts. So this was a government proposal, with the council delegated to work out the details.31 ‘

The FSA did not want to handle the corporate governance code because it would be vulnerable to pressure for concessions from politicians (other than Shiozaki). Thus the TSE was vulnerable to pressure from industry, and the FSA was vulnerable to pressure from politicians. “Each side has a weak point,” explains one central participant in the negotiations. “So if the FSA and TSE work together, then that should work.” In May 2014 the party issued its economic revitalization plan.33 Shiozaki drafted many of the sections related to corporate governance, with some help from Shibayama. Shiozaki also conferred with his party colleagues, but he only compromised with a few specific edits to appease the most persistent ones: 

‘When we had a draft of our report, I presented it at an LDP meeting. Some colleagues registered objections but I only listened to the ones who stayed after, not to those who left partway through. We revised specific language in response to this input.34’

For example, Shiozaki softened the language regarding reforms to the commodity derivative market to appease a leader of the party group on economic and industry issues (keisanzoku). And he revised a clause on the regulation of electronic bank transfers in response to a Diet member representing bank interests. He had hoped to go beyond a recommendation that banks reduce their industrial holdings to specify a requirement, but a cabinet member shot down that proposal. “

29 Author’s interview, May 27, 2014.
30 Benes interview; Nicholas Benes, “ How Japan’s Corporate Governance Code Was Born,” Board Director Training Institute blog, 2015; online at https://bdti.or.jp/en/blog/en/cgcodejapanbirth/ .
31 Author’s interview, May 29, 2014.
32 Author’s interview, May 29, 2014.
33 Liberal Democratic Party, “Nihon saisei bijon” [Japan Revitalization Vision] (Tokyo: LDP, May 23, 2014).
34 Author’s interview, May 29, 2014.

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